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Abstract. Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are finding important applications in
safety-critical systems such as Autonomous Vehicles (AVs), where perceiving
the environment correctly and robustly is necessary for safe operation. Raising
unique challenges for assurance due to their black-box nature, DNNs pose a fun-
damental problem for regulatory acceptance of these types of systems. Robust
training — training to minimize excessive sensitivity to small changes in input
— has emerged as one promising technique to address this challenge. However,
existing robust training tools are inconvenient to use or apply to existing code-
bases and models: they typically only support a small subset of model elements
and require users to extensively rewrite the training code. In this paper we intro-
duce a novel framework, PaRoT , developed on the popular TensorFlow platform,
that greatly reduces the barrier to entry. Our framework enables robust training to
be performed on existing DNNs without rewrites to the model. We demonstrate
that our framework’s performance is comparable to prior art, and exemplify its
ease of use on off-the-shelf, trained models and its testing capabilities on a real-
world industrial application: a traffic light detection network.
1 Introduction
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are finding important applications in safety-critical sys-
tems, such as Autonomous Vehicles (AVs), where perceiving a complex environment
correctly and robustly is necessary for safe operation [17, 11, 4]. The challenge of as-
suring these so-called AI-enabled systems is well-known [22] and has attracted the at-
tention of researchers and research bodies, e.g., DARPA [9]. Existing standards and
techniques — such as the ubiquitous ‘V’ model — lean heavily on the existence of a
clear specification to verify against [32]. Unfortunately, the very nature of deep learn-
ing — where the specification is implicit in the training data — poses a fundamental
problem for regulatory acceptance of these systems in a safety-critical domain.
One of the most troubling features of DNNs is their ‘intriguing’ susceptibility to
adversarial examples: imperceptible perturbations in the input space that cause a large
change in the output space. For example, causing an object detection network to mis-
classify an image [35]. Figure 1 shows an adversarial example on a traffic light detector.
The formal verification community has responded to this provocation with gusto [20,
19, 13, 3, 16, 5]. Exacerbating the verification challenge is the indirect nature of any
‘fixes’ that can be applied to failure of post-hoc formal verification for a DNN: typically
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Fig. 1. Traffic Light Detection Network: (a) an image from the test set in which the traffic light is
identified correctly; (b) an adversarial example: a subtly modified version of the original image,
identified using PaRoT; (c) norm of the difference between the original image and the adversarial
images; (d) the inference result on the adversarial example, with a confidence heatmap on the left
and bounding boxes of the identified traffic lights on the right.
an augmentation to the training set. Unlike with traditional software, fixes to DNNs can
feel very much like playing a game of whack-a-mole.
The emerging robust training paradigm, which integrates the verification process
directly into the training scheme, is, in our view, the most promising approach towards
formally verified neural networks. The goal of robust training is to minimize a so-called
worst-case adversarial loss. Formally, let Nθ : Rp → Rq be a neural network with p
input features and q outputs, parameterized with weights θ . Let B(x) be an `∞-ball of
radius  around an input point x ∈ Rp. For a given loss function L, we can define the
worst-case adversarial loss LNθ at a point x as:
LNθ (x, y) := max
x˜∈B(x)
L(Nθ(x˜), y) (1)
In general, one may replace the ball B(x) with some parameterized set pi(x). For a
set of labelled training data {(xi, yi)}ni=1, robust training can be formulated as a saddle-
point problem:
min
θ
max
i
LNθ (xi, yi) (2)
Finding the worst-case adversarial loss for a given example is computationally ex-
pensive in general. In practice, most approaches approximate the worst-case adversar-
ial loss in one way or another [41, 42, 27]. In recent years, robust training has pro-
gressed from single layer, dense networks to moderate — though not yet state-of-the-art
— sized Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs). This has brought these techniques
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within the realm of various DNNs used within the reference AV stack being built by
Five AI. In our bid to understand the practicalities of robust training, we found that
existing tools are inconvenient to use or apply to existing models: they typically only
support a small subset of model elements and require users to re-specify the models in
a specialized language, which can mean extensive rewrites to the training code.
To tackle these problems, we introduce a framework in this paper, called Practical
Robust Training (PaRoT)1, developed on the popular TensorFlow platform [1]. Our
framework allows robust training — using differentiable abstract interpretation [27] —
to be performed on arbitrary DNNs without any rewrites of the model. In PaRoT , one
can start a robust model training for a popular convolutional neural network with a
minimal amount of code, as we demonstrate in Listing 1.2. We have, for example, used
PaRoT to robustly train the traffic light detection network seen in Figure 1.
Contributions The main contribution of this paper is a practical framework, PaRoT ,
built in the Tensorflow platform [1]. In particular,
– Our tool can automatically apply abstract interpretation on an existing model defi-
nition. Thus, it can be used to verify robustness on existing DNNs without having
to change the model code, allowing for seamless adoption with existing codebases.
– Our framework implements a broad set of robustness properties that go beyond the
usual -ball, and provides a clean interface for specifying custom properties.
– We improve upon the abstract interpretation techniques used by Mirman et al. [27].
In particular, we refine several abstract transformers for activation functions.
Structure of paper In Section 2 we introduce the requisite background in robust training
with abstract interpretation. In Section 3 we describe the architecture and functionality
of the PaRoT framework and evaluate its performance in Section 4. In Section 5 we
place our work more broadly in the field of formal verification of DNNs. Finally, in
Section 6, we conclude and present future directions for this framework and paradigm.
2 Background
We build on the robust training approach of DiffAI, introduced by Mirman et al. [27],
where the inner maximization of Equation 2 is approximated using abstract interpreta-
tion. In this section, we sketch the mathematical prerequisites to our framework.
2.1 Abstract Interpretation
Abstract interpretation is a general theory for approximating infinite sets of behaviours
with a finite representation [7, 8]. In the present study, this corresponds to convex ap-
proximations of a non-convex adversarial polytope.
The two basic constructs in abstract interpretation are the abstract domain and the
abstract transformer. Intuitively, an abstract domain gives a finite (approximate) rep-
resentation of the (potentially infinite) concrete space, while an abstract transformer
1 The framework is available at https://github.com/fiveai/parot
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Fig. 2. An illustration of abstract domains. The dotted grey box corresponds to a domain object,
and the blue shape is the true set that the domain object seeks to approximate.
provides an over-approximation of the behaviour of a function. Formally, an abstract
domain is a setD (the domain) and a pair of maps α : P(Rp)→ D and γ : D → P(Rp),
called the abstraction and concretization maps, respectively. P(X) is the powerset of
X . The abstraction function is defined such that U ⊆ γ(α(U)) for all U ⊆ Rp.
Additionally, an abstract domain is equipped with a mapping from a fixed set of
primitive functions F to abstract transformers in D such that each f : Rp → Rq in F
is mapped to a function D(f) : D → D′. For each element in the concrete space, z,
transformers must obey the following soundness relation:
f [γ(z)] ⊆ γ(D(f)(z)) (3)
This ensures that transformers produce new abstract elements whose concretization
overapproximates the image of the function. Since transformers compose, we may
transform any composite function f = f1 ◦ f2 ◦ · · · ◦ fn : Rp → Rq where fi ∈ F . Fig-
ure 2 illustrates graphically the abstract domains and transformers for a single layer of
a DNN. We can construct a composite transformer D(N) that represents that network,
and write the sound approximation for an -ball around a point x as:
γ(D(N)[α(B(x))]). (4)
2.2 Abstract Domains for DNNs
We consider three abstract domain types: BOX, ZONOTOPE and HYBRIDZONOTOPE:
– BOX, represented by i = 〈c,b〉. A BOX domain is a p-dimensional axis-aligned
box, parameterized by its center c ∈ Rp and a positive vector b ∈ Rp>0 containing
the half-widths of the box. Figure 2 illustrates the concept of the BOX domain.
– ZONOTOPE, represented by z = 〈c,E〉. For dimension p, a ZONOTOPE is param-
eterized by a center point c ∈ Rp as well as a matrix E ∈ Rp×e for some fixed
dimension e. The set z ⊆ Rp is the E image of an e-dimensional hypercube, cen-
terd at c. The concretization is given by:
γ(z) := {c+E v : |vi| ≤ 1, i ∈ {1, . . . , e}} (5)
The key feature of a ZONOTOPE domain is that transformers exist for affine func-
tions — such as the matrix multiplications associated with transition functions of
DNNs — that do not increase the approximation error.
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– HYBRIDZONOTOPE, represented by h = 〈c,b,E〉. One problem with the ZONO-
TOPE domain is that computation can be expensive compared to a BOX domain.
The HYBRIDZONOTOPE solves this problem with the inclusion of an extra positive
vector b ∈ Rp>0, with a concretization:
γ(h) := {c+E v + diag(b) w | |vi| ≤ 1, |wj | ≤ 1,
i,∈ {1, . . . , e}, j ∈ {1, . . . , p}}. (6)
Note that these definitions mean that BOX and ZONOTOPE are both subsets of HY-
BRIDZONOTOPE. In the HYBRIDZONOTOPE domain, it is possible to convert b values
to E values and vice-versa through correlation and decorrelation, as noted in [28].
2.3 Hybrid Zonotope Transformers for DNNs
It is straightforward to show that exact transformers can be constructed for matrix mul-
tiplication [27]. In contrast, accurate modeling of piecewise linear activation functions,
such as relu(x) := max(x, 0), necessarily introduce an approximation. Here we gener-
alize the work in [34] to find optimal hybrid zonotopes for a given activation function.
Since activations are one-dimensional (1D) and act on each dimension separately, we
may consider just the problem in 1D. For a given function f : R→ R and input bounds
x, x, the challenge is to find a parallelogram containing the graph of f restricted to
[x, x] that has minimal area, as shown in Figure 3 below.
In the first instance, we consider an activation function f which is convex or con-
cave. If x = x, we can treat the transformer as acting on a point. Otherwise, we compute
the slope of the parallelogram:
µ :=
f(x)− f(x)
x− x
We provide an extremum function xf (µ) for the given f . Assuming a convex function:
xf (µ) = argmin
x∈R
(f(x)− µx) (7)
If f is concave, replace argmin with argmax. Since f is convex/concave, this xf (µ)
will always be in the interval [x, x] or otherwise f(x)−µx is zero everywhere in [x, x].
For many of the activation functions we care about, it is simple to find these extremum
functions. For example, xrelu(µ) = 0 and xexp (µ) = lnµ. Then, one can compute:
e := xf (µ) · µ− f(x) · x+ x · f(x)
x− x (8)
which may be interpreted as the height of the resulting zonotope parallelogram. From
this we may compute the center of the parallelogram in the y direction:
cy :=
1
2
(f(x) + f(x)− e) (9)
Finally we compute the new 1D hybrid zonotope:
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Fig. 3. Constructing zonotope transformers for relu and sigmoid activation functions.
D(f)〈cx, bx,Ex〉 = 〈cy, µbx + e
2
, µE〉 (10)
To extend this approach to nonconvex functions, such as sigmoid, we instead need
to find a pair of extrema xf (µ), xf (µ) which may in general depend on the interval
bounds [x, x]. In the case of sigmoid, one can show that these are minus the natural
logarithm of the solutions Y± to the quadratic equation µ + (2µ − 1)Y + µY 2 = 0.
Figure 3 shows zonotope transformers for relu and sigmoid activation functions.
2.4 Robust Training
To train with an abstract domain on a model N , from each training datum (x,y) we
compute a prediction value N(x) and a transformed domain object D(N)(B(x)) of
the domain representation of an `∞-ball B(x) around the input x for some fixed per-
turbation radius . An axis-aligned bounding box is drawn around the resulting output
domain object, and the vertex v furthest away from the true target y is chosen. We
construct a combined loss Lcomb with the standard loss, the adversarial loss, a mixing
factor λ ∈ R≥0, and a regularization term ξ(N):
Lcomb(x,y) := L(N(x),y) + λL( argmax
v∈D(N)(x)
‖v − y‖2,y) + ξ(N) (11)
3 PaRoT System Description
In this section, we detail how PaRoT can be used for robust training and testing. The
main overview of the system is presented in Figure 4. The training aspects of the frame-
work can be divided into domains (in the module parot.domains), which correspond to
the ones identified in Section 2.23, and properties (in the module parot.properties)
corresponding to the types of adversaries we are trying to robustify against. Section 3.2
presents the built-in properties available in PaRoT . As our system uses the TensorFlow
platform, we first introduce some terminology.
3 With the exception of the ZONOTOPE domain, which is not implemented in PaRoT .
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x
Fig. 4. PaRoT overview. Robust training is enabled by a property and an abstraction domain
which can be chosen from those supported by PaRoT or extended with a custom domain. Given
an input and a model prediction, PaRoT creates a domain object for the input based on the speci-
fied property, and it automatically transforms the operations associated with the model (see Sec-
tion 3.1). At testing time, PaRoT provides auxiliary utilities.
TensorFlow [1] is a deep learning platform that enables the user to build a compu-
tation graph representing their neural network model and training scheme. This com-
putation graph is a directed, acyclic graph whose nodes are tensors — a generalization
of matrices to potentially higher dimensions — and whose edges are called ops and
consist of a list of input and output tensors. An output tensor can be the input tensor for
arbitrarily many ops. To illustrate, the left-hand side of Figure 5 shows the computation
graph constructed for a single dense layer of a neural network. The ops MatMul (matrix
multiplication), BiasAdd (adding a bias to a value), and ReLU (rectified linear unit op-
eration) form those required to represent this example layer. Once a computation graph
has been created, TensorFlow compiles it, allowing PaRoT to use this graph to automat-
ically derive abstract transformers for a given model, as described in Section 3.1. This
enables a user to use an existing model and immediately start robust training without
needing code rewrites. It should be noted that the models supported by PaRoT must use
only the operations supported by the framework in the selected domain. A list of the
operations is available in Appendix A.
3.1 Automatic Transformer Generation
In order to transform a computation graph G from a given input tensor x to an output
tensor z, we find the subgraph Sx,z of G whose vertices are the ys such that there exist
paths x  y and y  z. This can be easily extended to multiple inputs and outputs.
This subgraph Sx,z is found through a graph traversal algorithm backtracking from z,
which also produces a pair of adjacency maps C and M . C maps a tensor to a set of
ops which consume it, while M maps an op f to the indices of the output tensors of the
op in G. Once Sx,z is constructed, the transformation process can begin. The output of
the process is a dictionary T which maps p-dimensional tensors to domain objects D
(or the constant None). T is constructed by iteratively exploring Sx,z starting at x. The
complete transformation algorithm is given in Algorithm 1.
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Algorithm 1: Automatic graph transformation algorithm
Data: A subgraph Sx,z, initial domain object D ∈ D
Result: A transformed domain object Z ∈ D
1 front← [x];
2 T ← {x 7→ D};
3 while front 6= ∅ do
4 s← pop front;
5 for f ← consumers of s in Sx,z do
6 s1, · · · , sn ← the inputs of f in G;
7 if ∃ i: si ∈ Sx,z ∧ si /∈ T then
8 continue; // wait for other inputs to be transformed
9 end
10 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n do
11 if si /∈ T ∨ T (si) = None then
12 Si ← si;
13 else
14 Si ← T (si);
15 end
16 end
17 T1, · · · ,Tm ← D(f)(S1, · · · ,Sn);
18 for 1 ≤ j ≤ m do
19 tj ← jth output of f ;
20 T (tj)← Tj ;
21 push j to front;
22 end
23 end
24 end
25 return T (z);
When transforming ops, various challenges arise. For example, a transformer D(f)
can accept inputs that are not domain objects but instead just tensors. This occurs, for
example, when a constant tensor needs to be added to a domain object. The acyclic
graph structure makes this transformation non-trivial. The first issue arises when an
operation consumes two or more domain objects. This happens in reticulated model
architectures e.g., SkipNet from [40].
To illustrate the challenges of transforming ops, take two tensors x, y, consider
the transformed computation graph for their addition x + y where both x and y have
abstract domains to be transformed. To transform + for the BOX domain, this entails
merely adding the cs and bs of x and y. However, for HYBRIDZONOTOPE, the man-
ner with which the merging should take place depends on how the E matrices were
constructed. If x and y are both derived from the same starting zonotope, then their E
matrices will both be referencing the same parameterization. In this case theEmatrices
for x and y can be added. However, if they originate from different starting zonotopes,
then their e dimensions may not match up, and in this case they need to be concatenated
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along the e dimension:
〈cx,bx,Ex〉+ 〈cy,by,Ey〉 := 〈cx + cy,bx + by, [Ex,Ey]〉 (12)
Similar considerations must be made for, e.g., the Concat op which concatenates two
tensors along a given dimension.
... more layers
MatMul(W,_)
BiasAdd(c,_)
Relu
MatMul(W,_) MatMul(abs(W),_) MatMul(W,_)
BiasAdd(c,_)
To Zonotope
Transformed Relu
Dense Layer
Training loss
Find worst case
W c
variables
Transform
Transform
Transform
Fig. 5. An example computation graph for robust training showing the original (blue) and gener-
ated (green) computation graph on a dense layer.
Another complication in extending transformers to computation graphs arises with
ops which do not output a transformed domain object. The most prominent example
of this is the Shape op which returns the dimensions of a tensor. We support these
operations by allowing the domain implementer to return None instead of a domain
object, flagging that the transformer algorithm should use the un-transformed output.
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1 from parot.domains import Box
2 from parot.properties import Property
3
4 class NewProperty(Property):
5 # define the supported domains of this property
6 SUPPORTED_DOMAINS = [Box]
7
8 def __init__(self, param)
9 # replace the initializer to accept desired parameters
10 pass
11
12 def generate_property(self, domain, input_tensor):
13 # implement the property here; safely assume domain is one
14 # of the types in NewProperty.SUPPORTED_DOMAINS
15 pass
16
17 # use the property on a tensor
18 x_box = NewProperty(param_instance).of(Box, x)
Listing 1.1. Implementing custom properties with PaRoT .
With these two considerations in mind, we have a procedure for transforming arbi-
trary TensorFlow graphs composed from a set of atomic transformers.
Figure 5 illustrates computing the transformed graph of the nodes on the left-hand
side which represent the ops of a dense layer. Each green group on the right-hand side
is the generated transformer computation graph of the corresponding f in the domain
HYBRIDZONOTOPE, i.e.,, the result of calling D(f) for the op. Note that the variables
from the original layer are shared with the transformed ops.
3.2 Robustness Properties
In this section, we describe several built-in robustness properties that can be trained
with in PaRoT , and an interface for specifying custom properties.
Built-in Properties Let 1s denote a tensor with shape s with all elements being ones.
All the following supported properties are centered on a training input x with shape s.
– BallDemoted: the `∞-norm ball adversarial attack represented as an axis-aligned
BOX where b =  · 1s.
– BallPromoted: another `∞-norm ball adversarial attack represented in the E ma-
trix of the HYBRIDZONOTOPE as E =  · diag(1s)
– Brightness: a simple property with a single column in E where all pixels may
have a constant added to them. That is, E =  · 1...s,1.
– UniformChannel: similar to Brightness except that each channel of the image is
allowed to vary independently.
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1 from parot.domains import Box
2 from parot.properties import Ball
3
4 # get the epsilon ball around the input in a given domain
5 x_box = Ball().of(Box, x)
6
7 # transform the graph and obtain the output box
8 y_box = x_box.transform(outputs=[y_pred], input=x)
9 y_adversary = y_box.get_adversary(y)
10
11 # create the combined loss function
12 regular_loss = loss_function(y, y_pred)
13 adversary_loss = loss_function(y, y_adversary)
14 combined_loss = regular_loss + λ * adversary_loss
15
16 # obtain the training operation
17 train_op = optimizer.minimize(combined_loss)
Listing 1.2. Given a model graph, return the training operation that optimizes a weighted version
of the loss function for adversarial training.
– Fourier: for a 2D image x, each column ofE is a plane wave. That is, each column
of E is an image I : H ×W → R:
I(i, j) =  · κ
(
i
2pin
H
+ j
2pim
W
)
,
for κ ∈ {sin, cos}, n ∈ {−N, ..., N} ⊂ Z and m ∈ {−M, ...,M} ⊂ Z. Our
motivation to investigate this property is to study the robustness to perturbations
that we might observe in real data collected in the field. For example, in the case
of detecting traffic lights, we can investigate whether it is possible to attack the
network using only low frequencies (to model markings or distortions on a physical
traffic light). An example of an adversarial example obtained through the Fourier
on MNIST [24] is shown in Figure 6.
Custom Properties Defining a custom property in PaRoT is as simple as implementing
a child class of Property, as presented in Listing 1.1.
3.3 Robust Training using PaRoT
Integrating our framework in a codebase can easily be done with minimal changes to
the existing code, as exemplified in Listing 1.2. Given a training dataset with inputs x
and groundtruth outputs y in tensor form, as well as the predictions of the model for the
inputs, y pred, we create a domain object using a BOX abstraction around the inputs
and transform the resulting computation graph. Then, a combined loss function can be
created and passed to the desired optimizer for robust training.
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4 Experiments
We evaluate PaRoT quantitatively to demonstrate performance, and qualitatively to val-
idate its ease of use. We first show that our performance is comparable to the results
obtained by DiffAI [27]. We then exemplify the ease of use on pre-trained models and
finish with qualitative examples demonstrating a PaRoT robustness property. Through-
out these experiments, we use the terms ‘standard’, ‘regular’ and ‘baseline’ interchange-
ably to describe a training process that solely uses a sparse cross-entropy loss.
In quantitative experiments, we make use of three metrics to measure performance:
– Test Error: percentage of misclassified examples in the testing set; the complement
of classification accuracy.
– Test error under a PGD attack: a test based on the state-of-the-art Projected Gradi-
ent Descent attack first presented in [26] and used in [27]. PGD finds an adversarial
example by following the gradient of the loss function inside an -ball around the
actual test example on the input side. Thus, the reported values correspond to a
lower bound on the percentage of the misclassified examples in the testing set that
are susceptible to an attack of this type.
– Test error under a HYBRIDZONOTOPE attack Verify: similar to the hSwitch upper
bound metric in [27], this metric uses the adversarial example discovered by the
HYBRIDZONOTOPE on the output side, as in (11). Thus, the reported values cor-
respond to an upper bound of the percentage of verifiably-susceptible examples in
the testing set under this attack.
4.1 DiffAI Comparison
To validate the results of our framework, we ran robust training experiments simi-
lar to those in [27] of the BOX and HYBRIDZONOTOPE domains for MNIST [24] and
CIFAR10 [23]. The architecture of the networks used is as defined in [27] and is also
presented in Appendix B. We similarly augment the loss with an adversarial term with
weight λ = 0.1 and an L2 regularization constant of 0.01. The learning rate and  used
are 10−3 and 0.1 for MNIST, and 10−4 and 0.007 for CIFAR10, respectively. We run all
experiments for 100 epochs using the Adam optimizer [21]. The results are in Table 1.
As the table shows, our framework achieves comparable results to those obtained
in [27]. In all cases, introducing an adversarial training method leads to a minor drop in
accuracy — an expected outcome when optimizing for a combined loss function with
a finite capacity [37, 18]. In terms of BOX training, we observe, as expected, a slight
increase in PGD and a strong increase in the number of verifiably-safe examples. For a
HYBRIDZONOTOPE training when compared to the baseline, we notice that the number
of examples susceptible to a PGD attack grows slightly while, in general, the number
of verifiable cases improves significantly. Overall, these results are similar and in many
cases improve upon the ones in [27] with minor exceptions that can be justified by
implementation differences and stochasticity in weight initialization.
4.2 Re-training Models
In this experiment, we showcase the ease of use of PaRoT using a pre-trained network.
We train a network with two convolutional layers and two dense layers, following the
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Dataset Model Train Method Test Error % PGD % Verify %
MNIST
FFNN
Baseline 1.8 3.2 100.0
BOX 3.2 4.2 30.6
HYBRIDZONOTOPE 3.2 4.0 30.2
ConvSmall
Baseline 1.4 2.4 100.0
BOX 2.0 2.4 12.8
HYBRIDZONOTOPE 1.8 2.4 91.8
ConvMed
Baseline 1.8 2.2 100.0
BOX 1.8 2.2 13.6
HYBRIDZONOTOPE 2.4 2.6 88.6
ConvBig
Baseline 0.6 1.2 100.0
BOX 1.2 1.4 14.0
HYBRIDZONOTOPE 1.8 2.0 74.2
ConvSuper
Baseline 0.6 1.0 100.0
BOX 1.0 1.2 12.2
HYBRIDZONOTOPE 1.0 1.6 72.4
Skip
Baseline 0.6 0.8 100.0
BOX 1.0 1.8 11.0
HYBRIDZONOTOPE 0.8 1.6 10.0
CIFAR10
FFNN
Baseline 45.8 45.8 100.0
BOX 50.4 50.4 76.2
HYBRIDZONOTOPE 48.8 48.8 75.8
ConvSmall
Baseline 33.3 33.4 100.0
BOX 36.2 36.2 72.0
HYBRIDZONOTOPE 38.6 38.6 96.2
ConvMed
Baseline 34.6 34.6 100.00
BOX 35.8 35.8 69.6
HYBRIDZONOTOPE 34.4 34.6 96.4
ConvBig
Baseline 35.4 35.6 100.0
BOX 36.0 36.0 71.2
HYBRIDZONOTOPE 38.0 38.0 99.4
ConvSuper
Baseline 34.4 35.2 100.0
BOX 33.6 34.2 100.0
HYBRIDZONOTOPE 35.3 35.4 98.6
Skip
Baseline 34.0 34.6 100.0
BOX 40.0 39.8 73.2
HYBRIDZONOTOPE 39.4 39.6 74.0
Table 1. Quantitative Comparison: results of running our framework on the same datasets, archi-
tectures and parameters as in [27]. In the experiments run, we used  = 0.1 for MNIST and 0.007
for CIFAR10.
14 E.W. Ayers, F. Eiras, M. Hawasly, I. Whiteside
Model Test Error % PGD % Verify %
Original 1.70 2.30 100.00
Re-trained (BOX) 2.88 1.47 14.80
Table 2. Re-training Models: comparison between the original network trained only with standard
loss and a re-trained network using an adversarial loss term.
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 6. Fourier Attack: example of a Fourier attack on an image of the MNIST dataset (a) an
image that under regular training is correctly identified as a 2 (b) an adversarial example identified
using PaRoT and a Fourier attack which leads the network trained with a standard loss function
to identify as a 3. (c) is a grid of thumbnails of the available Fourier terms that were added to (a).
architecture of ConvSmall (see [27]), on the MNIST dataset using a standard loss for 200
epochs (learning rate of 10−3) and save it to a TensorFlow checkpoint file. We proceed
to load this checkpoint’s graph, and, using PaRoT’s BOX abstract domain, add an adver-
sarial term to the loss function, which we then use to further train the loaded model for
100 epochs. The results of the process are presented in Table 2. Re-training achieves
similar accuracy, while improving significantly the PGD and verification metrics. It
should be noted that at no point in the re-training process did we have to re-define the
model or state the required operations, one of the main advantages of our framework.
4.3 Custom Robustness Properties: Case Study
As described in Section 3.2, PaRoT includes a variety of built-in robustness properties
on 2D images for HYBRIDZONOTOPE. In this section, we showcase the identification
of adversarial examples based on the Fourier property. Figure 6 exemplifies an attack
on a regularly trained network following the architecture of ConvMed (see [27]). The
Fourier robustness property is motivated by the observation that a typical adversarial
attack will include high frequency components which may be filtered away or rendered
irrelevant by the variability in the real-world input image. It is interesting to ask whether
adversarial examples exist only consisting of frequencies at roughly the scale of the
original image.
In this scenario, the network correctly identifies the Figure 6a as a 2, yet is stumped
by the adversarially generated image of Figure 6b (using the Fourier terms presented
in Figure 6c), mistakenly identifying it as a 3. After training with HYBRIDZONOTOPE
with λ = 0.1 and  = 0.01 for 200 epochs for this robustness property, the model
correctly identifies this specific example as a 2.
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5 Related Work
We consider three main areas of related work: early, heuristic approaches to training
more robust networks; formal verification tools that typically operate on fully trained
networks; and several other representative robust training approaches.
Heuristic approaches. Early art in adversarial robustness in the deep learning com-
munity broadly tackled the problem with heuristic techniques: with architecture and
training scheme modifications [14, 44, 6, 38]. These techniques have shown quite im-
pressive results, and real progress has been made to training more inherently robust
networks. However, it has been shown that these networks often remain susceptible to
simple attacks [30, 29]. This game of cat and mouse has led to ever more sophisticated
attack and defense, e.g., [12, 36, 43, 15, 26, 10, 2]. In terms of their usability, however,
many of these early approaches are comparable to ours. A lot of the techniques involve
modifications to the training scheme rather than the network architecture itself. As has
been shown, this is broadly similar to how robust training can be applied within our
framework. The main limitation of these approaches is that they do not provide guaran-
tees for robustness and, as ever, the bad guys tend to be one step ahead.
Formal verification Formal verification techniques provide guarantees on the robust-
ness of a DNN at individual data-points [20, 19, 13, 3, 16], and, in at least one case
for a small single-layer network, across the entirety of the input space [31]. Most of
the work in this area focuses on Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT), reachability
or optimization-based approaches to provide sound and complete guarantees on a per-
example basis [25]. It has been shown that many of these techniques can be viewed as
flavours of a unified Branch-and-Bound framework [5]. Through this lens, one can see
the scalability challenges as an artifact of the combinatorial branching associated with
piecewise-linear activation functions such as ReLUs. Similar to our framework, these
formal verification tools require no modification to an existing codebase. In practice,
most of the tooling is limited to a small subset of DNN activations and layer types (e.g.,
convolutional networks are often not supported) limiting their utility in practice. Fur-
thermore, the intractability of these approaches, as detailed in [25], detracts their use in
many of the larger networks we study in this paper. Lastly, as has been previously noted,
these approaches do not offer systematic improvements at scale, i.e., the verification or
falsification of each point needs to be considered iteratively in the training process.
Verifiably Robust Training Our work falls within a verifiably robust training approach.
We omit any theoretical comparison of the approaches, which is well described in [27].
Our system is most closely similar to DiffAI [27]. However, it distinguishes itself in
the way the abstract transformers are generated from existing models: DiffAI requires
that the user specify their model using specialized classes. This makes their library dif-
ficult to use with pre-existing models, since it requires rewriting the models to fit within
the DiffAI framework. Our framework, on the other hand, can take an existing Ten-
sorFlow graph [1] representing a model and transform it automatically without having
to rewrite any model code, as shown in Section 3. This makes it more practical to use
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within an existing pipeline, as it decouples the maintenance of the model from the veri-
fied robustness procedure, allowing for faster development and testing. We observe that
PaRoT achieves similar performance to DiffAI and in a similar total training times to
those reported in [27] for the same GPU configuration (Nvidia GeForce GTX 1080 Ti).
In [39], the introduced framework, MixTrain, reaches better accuracy and a higher
percentage of verifiably-safe examples when compared to [27]. Similarly, comparing
the results presented in [39] with ours, we conclude that MixTrain outperforms the
ones obtained in Section 4. However, it should be noted that some of techniques that
MixTrain uses to achieve this improvement can be replicated easily when using our
framework. For example, while in Listing 1.2 we defined the loss function as in [27]
for the sake of simplicity, our framework allows for flexible definitions, including the
dynamic loss function defined per epoch in [39].
Other works in this area involve convex relaxation techniques such as the ones pre-
sented in [33], or dual optimization techniques as in [42]. In terms of accuracy and
adversarial robustness, further studies need to be carried out to compare our work to
[33] and [42]. Despite this, the implementation of both [33] and [42] requires the re-
writing of the models to adapt to the method’s requirements, which, as in the case
of [27], constitutes a set back to integration efforts in production software stacks.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper we introduce PaRoT , a novel framework for verifiable robust training
that can be used directly on existing codebases and requires minimal code changes.
We believe that this is the first practical framework for robust training that supports
the vast majority of operations required for most large-scale models. Our work further
contributes to the community with the introduction of new abstract transformers, novel
formal robustness properties, and a framework for adding user-defined properties to
robust training. We plan to build upon this framework in several directions:
– We wish to investigate more natural training schemes that, for example, use the
robust loss more effectively and adapt the robustness property through the training
cycle. Similarly, we plan to explore how we could provide features such as the
stochastic robust approximation techniques from [39] for better performance.
– We also want to perform a theoretical study of abstract domains and training tech-
niques that scale better with larger DNN widths and lengths; a fundamental problem
of most of the methods presented in Section 5 [25]. It can be seen in Table 1, for ex-
ample, that HYBRIDZONOTOPEs did not perform as well as would be expected on
larger networks, and an in-depth analysis could help shed some light on the cause
of this phenomenon.
– We wish to introduce an API for users to easily add and test their own op trans-
formers, so that the framework can easily be extended to work on model code with
currently unsupported ops. Currently supported ops may be viewed in Appendix A.
– Finally, we would like to conduct a comprehensive ablation study that includes
many of the alternatives mentioned in Section 5 to further understand the compar-
ative performance of our framework.
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Appendix A Implemented TensorFlow Operations and Keras
Layers
Table 3 lists the currently implemented TensorFlow operations in PaRoT , while Table 4
shows the implemented Keras layers. Other Keras layers might be supported depending
on the implementation in terms of TensorFlow operations.
Appendix B Network architectures
We follow the design of [27]. For convolutional layers c × w × h [s] is for channels,
kernel width, kernel height and stride, respectively.
FFNN Five fully-connected layers, 100-node each, with ReLU.
ConvSmall Two convolutional layers with no padding (16× 4× 4 [2], 32× 4× 4 [2]),
followed by a 100-node fully-connected layer.
ConvMed Two convolutional layers with padding of 1 (16× 4× 4 [2], 32× 4× 4 [2]),
followed by a 100-node fully-connected layer.
ConvBig Four convolutional layers with padding of 1 ( 32× 3× 3 [1], 32× 4× 4 [2],
64× 3× 3 [1], 64× 4× 4 [2]), followed by a 512-node fully-connected layer, ReLU,
and a 512-node fully-connected layer.
ConvSuper Four convolutional layers with no padding ( 32× 3× 3 [1] , 32× 4× 4 [1],
64× 3× 3 [1], 64× 4× 4 [1]), followed by a 512-node fully-connected layer, ReLU,
and a 512-node fully-connected layer.
Skip A concatenation of two covolutional networks followed by ReLU, 200-node fully-
connected network, and ReLU. The two networks are:
– Three convolutional layers (16×3×3 [1], 16×3×3 [1], 32×3×3 [1]), followed
by a 200-node fully-connected layer
– Two convolutional layers (32× 4× 4 [1], 32× 4× 4 [1]) followed by a 200-node
fully-connected layer.
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Operation Type BOX HYBRIDZONOTOPE
Abs D
Add D D
BiasAdd D D
ConcatV2 D D (only between HZ and
tf.Tensor)
Conv2D D D (the second input should
be tf.Tensor)
Exp D
GreaterEqual D D
Log D
Log1p D
MatMul D D (only first input HZ)
Maximum D
MaxPool D D (only for
‘keras.MaxPool2D(2))
Mean D
Minimum D
Mul D D
Neg D D
OnesLike D D
Pack D
RealDiv D D
Relu D D
Reshape D D
Select D (first input not HZ)
Shape D D
Sigmoid D D
Softmax D D
StridedSlice D D
Sub D D
Sum D
Transpose D D
ZerosLike D D
Table 3. TensorFlow operations implemented in PaRoT
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Layer BOX HYBRIDZONOTOPE
Concatenate D D
Conv2D D D
Dense(’relu’) D D
Dense(’sigmoid’) D D
Dense(’softmax’) D D
Flatten D D
MaxPooling2D D D
Table 4. Keras layers supported by PaRoT out of the box
